New Realism and Scientific Realism

Quaestio 12:535-549 (2012)
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Abstract

The recent ‘new realist’ wave in philosophy reacts to the postmodernist/deconstructivist rejection of the notions of truth and objectivity by affirming the priority of the real over the subjective and socially constructed. Crucial in this dynamics is, among other things, the refusal of the anti-scientific stance integral to the non-realist view. In light of this, it is advisable to look at the new realism vs. antirealism debate from the perspective of the seemingly more local dispute concerning scientific realism vs. antirealism. Indeed, doing this enables one to exploit elements that are peculiar to the discussion concerning the epistemic content of scientific theories with a view to properly evaluating, and even clarifying and further articulating, the ‘new realist’ stance itself

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Matteo Morganti
Università degli Studi Roma Tre

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