Abstract

The intent of this thesis is to unravel some of the tangles which are encountered when one tries to define and explain freedom. There are actually two main arguments. The first is that freedom is to be defined relatively to the attaining of integration within oneself and with the world. The second is that a metaphysical framework significantly different from that which is typically used in debates regarding the possibility of freedom must be found, if an appropriate explanation of freedom is to be given. The purpose is not to take sides with any of the dominant theories. Rather, it is to point towards what I consider to be a more fruitful way of understanding freedom. ;The thesis has a dominantly negative tone, since it is, for the most part, a criticism of the more popular views on freedom. It is argued that most definitions are one-sided or unintelligible and that most debates on freedom are based on inappropriate assumptions about the nature of personal power and about the sorts of conditions that are necessary for freedom to be possible. ;Despite its predominantly critical component, the thesis has a constructive component as well. The attempt is made to construct a definition for freedom. The definition, in a sense, announces itself as the process of eliminating and refining the popular definitions proceeds. Further, as explanations are eliminated and refined, one can begin to understand what sort of framework is needed in order to give an adequate account of freedom. In the end, I propose that freedom is to be defined as the attainment of an integrated personality and of a harmony with the world. Moreover, freedom can be explained only by using a modified concept of causality and of the self as having substance-like qualities