For-itself and in-itself in Sartre and Merleau-ponty

Philosophy Today 17 (4):311-318 (1973)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that in beginning ``being and nothingness'' with the absolute ontological distinction between the for-itself (pure nothingness) and the in-itself (pure being), sartre makes it impossible to understand how the phenomenological account of experience which comes later in the work could be correct. attention is paid almost entirely to the critique of sartre implicit in the chapter of merleau-ponty's ``phenomenology of perception'' titled 'the cogito'. merleau-ponty's divergence from sartre is seen to center around his critique of sartre on the nature of the in-itself, the world, and the pre-reflective 'cogito'.

Other Versions

reprint Moreland, John M. (1973) "For-Itself and In-Itself In Sartre and Merleau-Ponty". Phil Today 17():311-318

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sartre on the phenomenal body and Merleau-ponty's critique.M. C. Dillon - 1974 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 5 (2):144-158.
Merleau-ponty: Key concepts.D. Morris - 2008 - In Rosalyn Diprose & Jack Reynolds, Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts. Routledge. pp. 111-120.
A Merleau-Pontian Critique of Sartrean Philosophy of Negation.Ümit Ege Atakan - 2024 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 32 (1):110-120.
Image and ontology in Merleau-Ponty.Trevor Perri - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):75-97.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-07-07

Downloads
124 (#180,092)

6 months
12 (#218,371)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references