Extensional and non-truth-functional contexts

Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164 (1969)
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Abstract

I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.

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Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Three types of referential opacity.Richard Sharvy - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (2):153-161.

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