Are omnipotence and necessary moral perfection compatible? Reply to Mawson

Religious Studies 39 (4):441-449 (2003)
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Abstract

In response to an earlier paper of mine, T. J. Mawson has argued that omnipotence is logically incompatible with wrong-doing, ‘whilst accepting that there is “a genuine, active power knowingly to choose evil” and thus leaving room for a free-will defence to the problem of evil’. Here, I attempt to show that Mawson is mistaken on both counts – that his argument for the incompatibility of omnipotence and wrong-doing is defective, and that the free-will defence cannot be sustained on the ground marked out by him. Given Mawson's understanding of power and freedom, I argue that it would be possible for God to create persons who are both free and unable to make evil choices.

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Citations of this work

Al-ghazālī's divine command theory.Shoaib Ahmed Malik - 2021 - Journal of Religious Ethics 49 (3):546-576.
Divine eternity.T. J. Mawson - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (1):35-50.

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Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.

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