A Hobbesian Welfare State?

Dialogue 27 (4):653- (1988)
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Abstract

Suppose that we have negative, natural rights to our lives, liberty, and possessions and that these rights are absolute or indefeasible. Then at best onlyminimal stateswill be legitimate, where such are states that restrict their activities to the enforcement of the basic rights of individuals and the like. Such appears to be the consequence of absolute natural rights. When made aware of these implications of absolute natural rights, many philosophers deny their existence. In the absence of a convincing defense of absolute natural rights, the defense of the minimal state thereby loses force.

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Citations of this work

The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity.Douglas J. Den Uyl - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):192-224.
In Defense of a Democratic Productivist Welfare State.Michael Moehler - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):416-439.

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References found in this work

Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
Ulysses and the Sirens.Jon Elster - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):82-95.

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