A Duty to Listen

Social Theory and Practice 39 (2):185-212 (2013)
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Abstract

It is a common line in democratic theory that citizens must only offer “public” reasons into political discourse. This is a civic obligation that is traditionally taken bypolitical liberals to fall on the citizen as speaker—as an individual who forwards political arguments. I argue here that taking proper account of the epistemic complexity involved in distinguishing public from nonpublic reasons entails robust civic obligations on listeners. Thus, those who accept this obligation for speakers must accept a corresponding civic obligation on listeners—a duty to attempt to identify public reasons within others’ presented arguments, even if those arguments appear nonpublic at first blush.

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Citations of this work

The Duty to Listen.Hrishikesh Joshi & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences.Galen Barry - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):52-76.
Is There a Duty to Speak Your Mind?Michael Hannon - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (3):274-289.

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