Abstract

The primary purpose of my thesis is to examine and refute Scheler's earlier doctrine of value and ethics. The thesis has two parts. The first deals with Scheler's interpretation and criticism of Kant's formal ethics. The second contains a refutation of Scheler's earlier views. I will also show that his later views are in accord with my criticisms. ;Scheler clarifies his own "material ethics of values" by a critique of Kant's formalism. He brings out three assumptions of Kant's formal ethics which he rejects. The first is the epistemological assumption that the a priori is not derived from experience and hence that the content of experience is not the source of the moral law. It is a purely formal law. The second is the psychological assumption that man is by nature hedonistic and hence that the moral law is not based on feelings but is purely formal and rational. The third is the metaphysical assumption that the empirical world is purely mechanistic and hence that the moral law lacks experiential content. In opposition to Kant, Scheler claims that what is good is given in experience , is revealed through feelings, and is found in our experience of the world. ;In the second part I refute Scheler on three issues. First, I refute Scheler's claim that an analysis of intentional feeling-acts proves that values exist. I show that he has not proven that values do exist. Second, I refute Scheler's claim that values are both, material and exist independently of man. Rather, the fact that values are material shows that they cannot exist independently of man. Third, I show that Scheler's attempt to explain ethics in terms of values is inadequate. For if values are absolute, independent, and eternal, they cannot have any practical relevance for us in life. Finally, I show that, even though one may accept his criticism of Kant's formal ethics, his own alternative is not convincing. Only in his later works does he move towards a more acceptable position