Hart, Radbruch and the Necessary Connection Between Law and Morals

Law and Philosophy 39 (6):691-704 (2020)
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Abstract

Legal positivism maintains a distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be. In other words, for positivists, a law can be legally valid even if it is immoral. H. L. A. Hart hoped to defend legal positivism against natural law. This paper analyses Hart’s criticism of Gustav Radbruch, a natural lawyer, before suggesting that Hart’s account of legal positivism gives rise to a logical problem. It is concluded that this problem leaves logical space for a theory of natural law based on moral authority rather than legal validity.

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References found in this work

Relations and Truthmaking.Fraser MacBride - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):161-179.
Positivism And The Inseparability Of Law And Morals.Leslie Green - 2008 - New York University Law Review 83:1035--1058.
A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects.Terence Parsons - 1975 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):73-86.
A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects.Terence Parsons - 1975 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):73-86.

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