Williamson and the Argument from Luminosity

Dialogue 47 (3-4):619- (2008)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states are not totally luminous, they are at least partially so.RÉSUMÉ: Plusieurs des résultats du livre de Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits dépendent de son argument à l'effet que la plupart, sinon tous nos états mentaux ne sont pas lumineux au sens où tout en se trouvant dans un tel état, nous sommes en position, de savoir que tel est notre état. Cet article a pour objectif de démontrer que ce raisonnement ne tient pas. Nous concluons par une distinction entre luminosité partielle ou complète et soutenons que, même si les états mentaux ne sont pas entièrernent clairvoyants, ils le sont en partie

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1951 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1956 - Studia Logica 4:255-261.
Luminosity and the safety of knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.

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