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Optimal auctions revisited
Artificial Intelligence 120 (1):29-42 (2000)
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Citations of this work
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai & Shigeo Matsubara - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence 130 (2):167-181.
Tractable combinatorial auctions and b-matching.Moshe Tennenholtz - 2002 - Artificial Intelligence 140 (1-2):231-243.
On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions.David Sarne, Shani Alkoby & Esther David - 2014 - Artificial Intelligence 215 (C):24-54.
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