Abstract

This work is divided into two main parts. In the first part formal, dialectical and speculative logic are distinguished on the basis of the formal logical laws of transition, reflection and development, and the speculative logical law of the unity of opposites. Each of the laws is carefully and precisely stated. It is shown that the laws of formal logic are contained within and governed by the dialectical logical law of reflection and in turn the laws of dialectical logic are contained within and governed by the speculative logical law of the unity of opposites, so to that extent speculative logic subsumes dialectical logic which in turn subsumes formal logic. In the second part of this work four formalizations of dialectical and/or speculative logic are critically examined: Butler's natural-deduction formalization, da Costa's paraconsistent formalization, Kosok's matrix-topological formalization and Routley's relevance formalization. About twenty other proposed formalizations are noted. A critique of formalization is presented. It is concluded that, on the basis of the laws of formal, dialectical and speculative logic, the formalization of dialectical and/or speculative logic is in principle not possible and only natural language is an adequate medium of expression for dialectical and speculative logic