Meta-Metaphysics, Constructivism, and Psychology as Queen of the Sciences

Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-10 (2024)
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Abstract

Remhof contends that Nietzsche is a metaphysician. According to his Meta-Metaphysical Argument, Nietzsche’s texts satisfy the criteria for an adequate conception of metaphysics. According to his Constructivist Argument, Nietzsche adopts a metaphysical position on which concepts’ application conditions constitute the identity conditions of their objects. This article critically appraises these arguments. I maintain that the criteria advanced in the Meta-Metaphysical Argument are collectively insufficient for delineating metaphysics as a distinct field of inquiry and that the Constructivist Argument attributes a position to Nietzsche that remains vulnerable to his evaluative and psychological indictments of two-world metaphysics. I conclude by discussing how these objections might help non-metaphysical readers of Nietzsche resist Remhof’s interpretation.

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James Mollison
Purdue University

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References found in this work

Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Beyond Good and Evil.Friedrich Nietzsche & Helen Zimmern - 1908 - International Journal of Ethics 18 (4):517-518.
On the Genealogy of Morality.Friedrich Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-Pearson & Carol Diethe - 1995 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 9:192-192.
Nietzsche: Metaphysician.Justin Remhof - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):117-132.

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