Abstract

Kant claims that things-in-themselves produce in us sensible representations. Unfortunately, this“transcendental affection” appears to be inconsistent with Kant’s prohibition against applying thecategory of causality to things-in-themselves.This paper gives an account of transcendental affection that does not require it to be seen as a type ofcausation. Transcendental affection, properly understood, is the logical relation of the ground of thingsin-themselves to the consequent of an affected subject. This relation is what one gets when one deschematizescausation, revealing the underlying hypothetical form of judgment.So conceived, transcendental affection no longer poses a potentially debilitating problem for theinterpreter of Kant who contends that things-in-themselves enjoy an independent objective existence.The paper, then, is a partial defense of such an interpreter against the Kantian interpreter who contendsthat the thing-in-itself is merely a limiting concept useful for the regulation of thought