Abstract

Almost throughout the history of philosophy, non-existent objects have been a philosophical puzzle. In the last one hundred years, the problem has generated renewed interest and has resolved itself into a set of problems in the theory of reference. Major treatments of reference by Meinong, Frege, Russell, and Strawson all contain unsatisfactory features. In this dissertation, a new conception of reference which avoids the difficulties is generated. It relies on the idea of an "account" within which reference can be made. In addition to avoiding earlier problems, such a new conception has a number of positive features of its own. ;My theory is that reference is intentional, not requiring the existence of its objects for its successful completion. This view is supported by checking reference-contexts to insure that the principle of substitutivity salva veritate and Existential Generalization indeed fail there. After demonstrating that contexts of reference are intentional, I proceed to analyze reference in terms of accounts. It is possible to specify, with respect to accounts, when substitutivity salva veritate and Existential Generalization can succeed. An account relativized to a treatment of reference can also help in the construction of a principle of individuation for objects of reference. In addition, I show that objects of reference and objects of thought are equivalent in extensions. Finally, I claim that every name and description refers to an object of reference. This theory of reference is better able than previous accounts to explain the use of "refers" in ordinary language; it also has perhaps a healthier respect for the strong intuitions of common sense