Abstract

In this entry, the origin of the concept ‘thought style’ will be traced back to Karl Mannheim’s work in the sociology of knowledge. Afterwards, the most influential version today – Ludwik Fleck’s concept of thought styles – will be discussed in detail. This entry will examine (1) the different elements of which a thought style is composed, and (2) its epistemological and ontological consequences. In this context, it will be pointed out that problems of understanding between adherents of different thought styles can arise due to their different ontological commitments. Furthermore (3), the virtues and vices of thought styles as an analytical tool for examining scientific activities will be analysed. Here, the apparent relativistic consequences of thought styles and Fleck’s puzzling stance regarding relativistic claims concerning his theory will be discussed. Finally (4), a closer look will be taken at the relation between art and science that the term ‘style’ brings to the fore.