Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?

Axiomathes 26 (2):205-218 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility.

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Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to Brown.Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (2):9-22.
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Reports of the Death of Value-Free Science Are Greatly Exaggerated.Josef Mattes - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):689-699.
Mindfulness and the psychology of ethical dogmatism.Josef Mattes - 2018 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 28:233-269.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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