Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective

Acta Analytica 38 (1):53-67 (2023)
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Abstract

In his important and original book, Knowing and Checking, Guido Melchior provides advice on how to tackle skepticism. I argue that his analysis points to a possible virtue-theoretic answer to skepticism, which I call the restraint solution, i.e., activate your self-trust and restrain your inquisitiveness! It leads one to the ideal of bounded reflective curiosity: when it comes to knowledge, we should restrain our second-order, reflective curiosity and stay content with the somewhat Moorean trust in ordinary everyday beliefs. We can preserve our ordinary, first-order vigilance and investigative interest (curiosity) without falling into skeptical over-caution which is basically a reflective, second-order vicious attitude.

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Nenad Miščević
Central European University

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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
Checking again.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):84-96.

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