Causal Knowledge and the Process of Policy Making: Toward a Bottom-up Approach

In Federica Russo & Phyllis Illari (eds.), The Routledge handbook of causality and causal methods. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 571-587 (2024)
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Abstract

What are the roles of scientific causal knowledge in relation to the evidential requirements of policy making? In this chapter, I review the existing approaches in philosophy of science to the policy relevance of causal knowledge. I assess the specific concerns and questions on which these philosophical accounts have focused and show how they only offer a partial perspective of the relation between causal knowledge and policy making. Most existing views are top-down approaches: they start from philosophical concerns about causation and evidence, and then make general claims about (potential) policy implications, but leave the notion of “policy” unanalyzed. As an alternative, I put forward some ideas toward a bottom-up approach: one that understands policy making as a dynamic process with several stages, and that starts from concrete policy problems, to then examine how causal notions and methods can contribute in various ways to the specifics of the process of policy making.

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Luis Mireles-Flores
University of Helsinki

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