On Contingently Error-theoretic Concepts

American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):181-190 (2010)
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Abstract

An error theorist about a particular discourse combines the cognitivist thesis that the discourse is truth-apt with the thesis that core statements asserted by the discourse are false. For instance, one is an error theorist about witch discourse if one thinks that witch discourse is truth-apt and that some of the entities and properties quantified over by core statements in the discourse, namely witches and magical powers, do not exist and hence that certain core statements of the discourse are false

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Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

References found in this work

Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
Why We Need A - Intensions.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):257-277.
Sexual perversion.Graham Priest - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):360 – 372.

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