Abstract

In the so-called ‘irony debate,’ one of the most infamous polemics of modern intellectual history, G.W.F. Hegel accuses his German romantic contemporaries of being ‘nicht im Ernst’—not in earnest—with respect to irony. Given how this complaint is lodged alongside other, highly charged accusations (e.g. ‘hypocrisy,’ ‘absolute sophistry’ and ‘evil’), the unsurprising consensus among scholars today is that Hegel’s critique does injustice to the philosophically rich account of romantic irony. Acknowledging this vindication of romantic irony, however, I want to revisit and revise this criticism in a way that makes sense of the seemingly paradoxical claim that earnestness, rather than being the opposite of irony, is the very condition of it. Having clarified both the robust normativity of romantic irony as well as the specific shortcomings of Hegel’s critique in the first part of this paper, I then articulate what I call the ‘earnestness condition,’ or EC, according to which irony is in earnest when (a) it has substance, and (b) is grounded in its substance. Developing this account both advances a largely stalled scholarly discussion of the irony debate and develops a conceptual language useful for distinguishing between thick and thin kinds of irony in use today.