A Perfectionist Defense of Free Speech

Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):213-230 (2012)
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Abstract

It is often said that if free speech means anything it means freedom for the thought we hate. This core idea is generally referred to as “viewpoint neutrality” and is consistent with the liberal intuition that governments should remain neutral with regard to conceptions of the good life. None of the traditional defenses of free speech seem to secure viewpoint neutrality, however. Instead, each justification leaves room to censor some viewpoints. Ironically my defense of viewpoint neutrality does not come from the liberal assumption that governments should remain neutral about the good life. I defend a version of the virtue argument for free speech that is explicitly perfectionist—-government does not have to remain neutral when promoting good lives for its citizens. Free speech is not just a means to promote virtue but is part and parcel of intellectual virtue—-a decidedly perfectionist value.

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Joshua Miles
Azusa Pacific University

Citations of this work

Freedom of expression.Matteo Bonotti & Jonathan Seglow - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (7):e12759.

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