Moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence: A formal model of unconscious moral and legal knowledge

In B. H. Ross, D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka & D. L. Medin, Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making. Academic Press (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Could a computer be programmed to make moral judgments about cases of intentional harm and unreasonable risk that match those judgments people already make intuitively? If the human moral sense is an unconscious computational mechanism of some sort, as many cognitive scientists have suggested, then the answer should be yes. So too if the search for reflective equilibrium is a sound enterprise, since achieving this state of affairs requires demarcating a set of considered judgments, stating them as explanandum sentences, and formulating a set of algorithms from which they can be derived. The same is true for theories that emphasize the role of emotions or heuristics in moral cognition, since they ultimately depend on intuitive appraisals of the stimulus that accomplish essentially the same tasks. Drawing on deontic logic, action theory, moral philosophy, and the common law of tort, particularly Terry's five-variable calculus of risk, I outline a formal model of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence along the foregoing lines, which defines the abstract properties of the relevant mapping and demonstrates their descriptive adequacy with respect to a range of common moral intuitions, which experimental studies have suggested may be universal or nearly so. Framing effects, protected values, and implications for the neuroscience of moral intuition are also discussed.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,449

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral heuristics.Cass R. Sunstein - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):531-542.
A Cognitive–Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment.Adenekan Dedeke - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 126 (3):437-457.
Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions.Hanno Sauer - 2017 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism.Peter Singer - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):560-561.
Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods.David O. Brink - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):179-201.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
135 (#168,283)

6 months
9 (#328,796)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references