Computational Knowledge Representation in Cognitive Science

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (3):138-152 (2019)
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Abstract

Cognitive research can contribute to the formal epistemological study of knowledge representation inasmuch as, firstly, it may be regarded as a descriptive science of the very same subject as that, of which formal epistemology is a normative one. And, secondly, the notion of representation plays a constitutive role in both disciplines, though differing therein in shades of its meaning. Representation, in my view, makes sense only being paired with computation. A process may be viewed as computational if it adheres to some algorithm and is substrate-independent. Traditionally, psychology is not directly determined by neuroscience, sticking to functional or dynamical analyses in the what-level and skipping mechanistic explanations in the how-level. Therefore, any version of computational approach in psychology is a very promising move in connecting the two scientific realms. On the other hand, the digital and linear computational approach of the classical cognitive science is of little help in this way, as it is not biologically realistic. Thus, what is needed there on the methodological level, is a shift from classical Turing-style computationalism to a generic computational theory that would comprehend the complicated architecture of neuronal computations. To this end, the cutting-edge cognitive neuroscience is in need of а satisfactory mathematical theory applicable to natural, particularly neuronal, computations. Computational systems may be construed as natural or artificial devices that use some physical processes on their lower levels as atomic operations for algorithmic processes on their higher levels. A cognitive system is a multi-level mechanism, in which linguistic, visual and other processors are built on numerous levels of more elementary operations, which ultimately boil down to atomic neural spikes. The hypothesis defended in this paper is that knowledge derives not only from an individual computational device, such as a brain, but also from the social communication system that, in its turn, may be presented as a kind of supercomputer of the parallel network architecture. Therefore, a plausible account of knowledge production and exchange must base on some mathematical theory of social computations, along with that of natural, particularly neuronal, ones.

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Igor Mikhailov
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

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