Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse?

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):611-615 (2015)
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Abstract

I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments

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Josefa Toribio
Universitat de Barcelona

References found in this work

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.

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