Precedent Autonomy: Life-Sustaining Intervention and the Demented Patient

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8 (2):189-199 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How aggressively should we pursue life-sustaining treatment of the demented patient? This question becomes increasingly important as our population ages and medical technology offers ever more life-prolongation. In Life'sDominion, Ronald Dworkin addresses the issue in the context of an Alzheimer patient who had previously declared the desire to avoid life-sustaining intervention. Dworkin argues for the primacy of what he calls precedent autonomy: In 1995, the HastingsCenterReport carried thoughtful rebuttals by Daniel Callahan and Rebecca Dresser. Much of Callahan's article is devoted to patients who never executed an advance directive, but he states unequivocally that such directives can be overridden, basing much of his argument on the writings of Sanford Kadish. Together, Dresser, Callahan, and Kadish define a clear position opposed to precedent autonomy

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,337

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The concept of precedent autonomy.John K. Davies - 2002 - Bioethics 16 (2):114–133.
La autonomía y el yo demente.Ronald Dworkin - 1997 - Análisis Filosófico 17 (2):145-156.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-24

Downloads
57 (#376,745)

6 months
11 (#345,260)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references