Response to Daly and Langford

Mind 119 (476):1117-1121 (2010)
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Abstract

In this note, I defend Melia 2000 against objections in Daly and Langford 2010. I show that my formulation of the Comprehension Schema is correct while their modification is inadequate and that their approach to the problem through infinitary sentences is irrelevant to my original arguments. Finally, I argue that it is not a puzzle that we could find mathematics indispensable in our theorising, even when the mathematics is false

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2011-01-08

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Jan Melia
University of Ulster

Citations of this work

Good weasel hunting.Robert Knowles & David Liggins - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3397-3412.
How Not to Enhance the Indispensability Argument.Russell Marcus - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):345-360.
Towards a Fictionalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Manchester

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