Abstract

Two tests of Marx's world-view are then offered and evaluated. It is shown that his theory of socio-political revolution had to be defended morally but never was; and that, even if it were, its support would be tenuous at best, because the conditions Marx assumed as characterizing the nature of capitalist society cannot be said to be features of post-capitalist society. Finally, the principle of distributive justice expected by Marx to apply to the communist society is shown to be self-defeating. ;This study argues that, contrary to the now orthodox view, Marx's system cannot be designated "scientific" in a strict sense, for it is an essentially socio-political revolutionary doctrine constituting a world-view. But as a world-view that aims at the radical transformation of the world, it was required to contain its ethical justification or to point, at least, to its moral defence. This, however, it has not done. Unless, therefore, or until such a justification is provided, Marx's system will remain incomplete. But given the essential contestability of its core doctrines, Marx's system may not be completable. ;On the other hand, Marx had a theory of the genesis and function of morality and ethics which, in respect of the latter, is here treated as Marx's meta-ethics. For his theory of ideology contains a doctrine of moral ideology. An examination of Marx's meta-ethical views reveals that this doctrine is, as an offshoot of his materialist conception of history, largely untenable. Therefore Marx's ethical views lose one of their fundamental props. The other such prop derives from Marx's ethical stance , as it is reconstructed in this study from Marx's moral intimations that can be found embedded even in his economic doctrine. It is argued that Marx's ethical views are problematic since they flow from prima facie plausible but unwarranted assumptions