Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics

In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 144-158 (2022)
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Abstract

In this chapter, my aim is to present an account of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism that centers his view of propositions as mental acts. As I intend to show, Kant’s strategy in the Critique of Pure Reason is only intelligible under the assumption that the fundamental bearers of truth are mental entities.

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Damian Melamedoff-Vosters
New York University, Shanghai

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