Exciting intentions

Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312 (1990)
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Abstract

In this paper, I restrict the discussion to overt intentional action, intentional action that essentially involves peripheral bodily movement. My guiding question is this: If there is a specific motivational role that intention is plausibly regarded as playing in all cases of overt intentional action, in virtue of what feature(s) of intention does it play this role? I am looking for an answer that can be articulated in the terminology of intentionalist psychology.

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

Citations of this work

On snubbing proximal intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2833-2853.
On the Nature of Testimony.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):114-127.
Dretske's intricate behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.

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