Deciding: how special is it?

Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):359-375 (2021)
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Abstract

To decide to A, as I conceive of it, is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to A. I argue that ordinary instances of practical deciding, so conceived, falsify the following...

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10.1080/13869795.2021.1957203

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.
Reasons, intentions, and actions.Randolph Clarke - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6).
Deciding Under a Description.Matthew Heeney - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2):191-209.
On being able to intend.Alfred R. Mele - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):51-71.

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References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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