Abstract

I assume a presumption in favor of free speech in liberal societies and attempt to refute possible objections against publishing the Danish cartoons of Muhammed that appeal to offense, insult, harm, the speech act wrong of subordination, the illusory nature of “free speech,” and legal inconsistencies that favor Christianity. The notions of offense and insult are unclear. Moreover, the offended and insulted play a role in constituting these acts. Legitimate restrictions on harmful acts are limited to behavior that poses a clear and present danger; such cases can be handled without violating viewpoint-neutrality, to which liberalism is committed. Altman’s notion of a speech act wrong of subordination makes unwarranted assumptions about speakers’ intent and offers no rational way to discern intent or gauge the expression’s emotive force. Policies for prohibiting speech based on content are inherently vague and overly broad; their underlying justifying reasons overreach. Fish’s arguments for showing that the notion of free speech is confused are inconsistent; they also move fallaciously from well-defined exceptions to free speech to sweeping conclusions that make speech negotiable. Legal inconsistencies can be removed simply by repealing laws that show partiality toward a certain religion. The Danish cartoons expressed justified outrage over Muslim abuses of individual rights in liberal countries, and did so in a peaceful manner. The cognitive content of the cartoons is inseparable from the cartoons’ satirical mode of expression. Muslims’ complaints over expression critical of Islam amount to special pleading that is rooted in bad faith. Publishing the cartoons was a virtuous act that protected the tolerant, liberal ethical environment of Denmark