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Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):541 (2009)
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It is likely misbelief never has a function.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):529-530.
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Effective untestability and bounded rationality help in seeing religion as adaptive misbelief.Konrad Talmont-Kaminski - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):536-537.
You can't always get what you want: Evolution and true beliefs.Jeffrey P. Schloss & Michael J. Murray - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):533-534.
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Citations of this work
Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.
A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy.Andrea Polonioli - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3841-3867.
Belief in free will as an adaptive, ungrounded belief.Matthew Smithdeal - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1241-1252.
Religious Intuitions and the Nature of “Belief”.Jamin Halberstadt, Evan Balkcom, Jesse Bering & Victoria K. Alogna - 2019 - Studia Humana 8 (3):58-68.
References found in this work
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel Clement Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1984 - London, England: MIT Press.
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
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