Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):39-42 (2000)
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Abstract

Identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth are fundamental philosophical concerns. Colin McGinn treats them both philosophically and logically, aiming for maximum clarity and minimum pointless formalism. He contends that there are real logical properties that challenge naturalistic metaphysical outlooks. These concepts are not definable, though we can say a good deal about how they work. The aim of Logical Properties is to bring philosophy back to philosophical logic.

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reprint McKeon, Matthew (2003) "McGinn Colin. Logical properties: identity, existence, predication, necessity, truth. Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000, vi+ 114 pp". Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9(1):39-42

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Matthew W. McKeon
Michigan State University

Citations of this work

Time's ontic voltage.Craig Callender - 2011 - In Adrian Bardon (ed.), The Future of the Philosophy of Time. London: Routledge. pp. 73-94.
Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content.Mark Rowlands - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):303-316.
Existência.João Branquinho - 2015 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.

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