Kilimanjaro

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):141-163 (1997)
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Abstract

This is not an overly ambitious paper. What I would like to do is to take a thesis that most people would regard as wildly implausible, and convince you that it is, in fact, false. What's worse, the argument I shall give is by no means airtight, though I hope it's reasonably convincing. The thesis has to do with the fuzzy boundaries of terms that refer to familiar middle-sized objects, terms like ‘Kilimanjaro’ and ‘the tallest mountain in Africa.’ It is intuitively clear that Kilimanjaro has a fuzzy boundary, so that there are some clods of earth at the base of the mountain for which there isn't anything, either in our practices in using the word ‘Kilimanjaro’ or in the facts of geography, that determines an answer to the question whether the clod is a part of Kilimanjaro.

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Vann McGee
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):81-114.
Fiat objects.Barry Smith - 2001 - Topoi 20 (2):131-148.
Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity.Robert Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.
Vagueness in Geography.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):49–65.

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References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
Reference and Essence.Nathan U. Salmon - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (3):363-364.
Distinctions Without a Difference.Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.

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