Abstract

When we critically investigate a moral theory, such as utilitarianism, we are interested not only in the moral judgments such a theory would yield, but also in the attitudes and actions characteristic of the moral practitioner, in this case a utilitarian. For moral theories must be practical. Such theories can be distinguished in part from each other on the basis of he practices and attitudes adopted by their adherents. So it is fair to ask of any moral theory two basic questions: is the theory ‘practicable’ and, if it is, does its practice seem moral? If a moral theory is not practicable because, say, its practice frustrates its intention, then that theory as it stands is not acceptable as a moral theory. If it is practicable but its characteristic practices seem immoral, then at best the theory stands in need of some defence by its advocates. They may either explain away the appearance of immorality by showing that contrary to first impressions the practices are not opposed to our untutored moral views, or that our untutored moral views are more questionable than the theory's practices.