Metaphysical foundations and ponderomotive nature

Kant Studien 96 (3):269-311 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Any attempt to assess the validity of Kant’s basic philosophical approach to the problems of physics must begin, not with a comprehensive metaphysical foundation of natural science but, rather, with the metaphysical foundation of the science directed to the primordial basis of nature, viz., the science of ponderomotive nature. The concrete aggregate of its constructive concerns is the aggregate of momenta. The synthesis of this aggregate is subject to a dynamic reciprocity of nature under the two radical aspects of reality and unreality – factors or “aspects” reflected in cognition as subjective activity and its immediate objective correlate. The synthetic enterprise culminates in the recognition of a schematic event-unity, which is at the same time the basis of the possibility of emergence from the preceding sphere of ponderomotive nature into a higher-synthetic sphere of concrete, materio-formal nature.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,337

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

From General to Special Metaphysics of Nature.Michael Bennett McNulty & Marius Stan - 2017 - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 493-511.
On Kant's Philosophy of Natural Science.Wen-Sheng Wang - 2004 - Philosophy and Culture 31 (2):143-162.
Kant’s Proof of the Law of Inertia.Kenneth Westphal - 1995 - In Hoke Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress. Marquette University Press. pp. 413-424.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
26 (#853,300)

6 months
4 (#1,249,230)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references