Abstract

I consider four theories of human action and freedom of action, from the first half of the thirteenth century at Paris, including the theories of William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great. These philosophers argue that actions result from the activities of cognitive and volitional capacities, i.e., intellect and will. Free actions come about primarily either in virtue of intellect or in virtue of the will. Thus, each of these theories falls into one of two broad categories; the position that freedom is ultimately a function of intellect I call a cognitive theory of freedom while the position that freedom is ultimately a function of the will I call a volitional theory of freedom. Each of these general theories faces a serious objection, what I call the determinism objection in the case of cognitive theories, and what I call the arbitrariness objection, in the case of volitional theories. According to the determinism objection, the fact that intellect appears to be determined by factors beyond human control implies that actions in turn will be determined by the intellective judgments that shape them. But if actions are free in virtue of the will, one's choice of an alternative for action can be divorced from one's judgments, which makes those actions unintelligible . Cognitive theories of freedom can answer the determinism objection; however, this answer generates a version of the arbitrariness objection. Nevertheless, this leaves cognitive theories no worse off than volitional theories. Moreover, cognitive theories retain an important advantage over volitional theories in that they preserve an explanation for action. ;My dissertation also has a historical aim. I examine the work of previous philosophers who helped shape the thirteenth-century discussion. These include Peter Lombard, Augustine, Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, John Damascene, and Aristotle. I trace broadly the development of this topic in the Middle Ages through the first half of the thirteenth century. ;Like the vast majority of medieval philosophical texts, the texts on which I focus are not available in translation. Therefore, I include my own translations as appendices