Focus More on Causes and Less on Symptoms of Moral Distress

Journal of Clinical Ethics 28 (1):30-32 (2017)
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Abstract

In this commentary on Carse and Rushton’s call for reorientation of moral distress, we state agreement with the authors that the discourse of moral distress should refocus on the moral components of integrity. We then explain how our philosophical taxonomy of moral distress, mentioned by the authors, appeals to moral integrity. In this process, we clarify our taxonomy’s appeal to Aristotle’s concept of akrasia. We conclude by offering support of Carse and Rushton’s challenge to organizations to strengthen moral integrity by fostering resilience.

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Laurence McCullough
Baylor College of Medicine

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