Compatibilism in Quantum Mechanics: A New Perspective on Free Will and Determinism

Abstract

This paper presents a novel argument for compatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are compatible. Drawing on principles from quantum mechanics, specifically the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the concept of superposition, the paper proposes an analogy between the behavior of particles at the quantum level and the choices made by free agents. It argues that just as particles exist in a field of possibilities until observed, actions exist in a field of possibilities until a decision is made. The deterministic aspect comes from the natural laws that govern the behavior of particles (and, by extension, our actions), while the free will aspect is represented by the field of possibilities from which we can choose. The paper further explores the implications of this perspective for our understanding of moral responsibility and the nature of reality. It concludes by suggesting that our collective observations and choices contribute to the creation of our shared reality, underscoring the interconnectedness of all beings.

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Kaden McCullough
Gonzaga University

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