A method for interpreting continental and analytic epistemology

Abstract

Current investigations in epistemology tend to follow either the continental or the analytic school of thought. These schools of thought have different goals for epistemology and different procedures for achieving these goals. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility and profitability of communication between analytic and continental philosophy in epistemology. Wittgenstein's concept of language games will be used to frame the issue', continental and analytic philosophers play different language games. One can successfully interpret a particular language game from the perspective of another language game using the principle of charity. Specifically, the principle of charity allows analytic and continental epistemological to communicate profitably

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