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Appearances and the Problem of Stored Beliefs
In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 63–74 (2023)
Abstract
Internalist theories of epistemic justification supposedly have trouble explaining what justifies beliefs that are both stored in memory and currently out of mind. This is the problem of stored beliefs. This chapter provides a preliminary defence of stored/dispositional appearances and suggests that they provide a straightforward solution to the problem of stored beliefs.Author Profiles
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