The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being

Philo 6 (2):299-313 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Modal Perfection Argument (MPA) for the existence of a Supreme Being is a new ontological argument that is rooted in the insights of Anselm, Leibniz and Gödel. Something is supreme if and only if nothing is possibly greater, and a perfection is a property that it is better to have than not. The premises of MPA are that supremity is a perfection, perfections entail only perfections, and the negation of a perfection is not a perfection. I do three things in this paper. First, I prove that MPA is valid by constructing a formal deduction of it in second order modal logic. Second, I argue that its premises are true. Third, I defend the argument and the logic used against some likely objections.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument.Graham Oppy - 2004 - Philo 7 (2):203-211.
The Ontological Argument.Robert E. Maydole - 2009 - In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 553–592.
Maydole on Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2012 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. pp. 445.
Perfection and Reality in The Only Possible Argument.Emanuele Cafagna - 2024 - Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 226:81-100.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-24

Downloads
466 (#61,278)

6 months
21 (#140,658)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Meeting the Evil God Challenge.Ben Page & Max Baker-Hytch - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):489-514.
Reverse Ontological Argument.James Henry Collin - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):410-416.
A gödelian ontological argument improved.Alexander R. Pruss - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (3):347-353.
A simpler free will defence.C’Zar Bernstein & Nathaniel Helms - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):197-203.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references