Abstract

Scientific realism was famously proclaimed dead back in the early 1980s (Fine 1984). Michela Massimi’s exciting new book says otherwise. For Massimi, realism is alive and well, only we need to reconsider what we take to be the defining question of scientific realism, which, to her, is best construed not along ontological lines, i.e., whether entity X exists, but along epistemological lines, i.e., how we come to reliably know nature. Put more explicitly, for Massimi, to be a realist is to be able to explain “how historically and culturally situated epistemic communities have over time come to reliably advance claims of scientific knowledge” (4). The role of reliability in science has been long recognized, for example, by Kitcher (1993), Oreskes (2019), and most recently Cartwright et al. (2022). What is new about Massimi’s proposal is her emphasis on the role played by scientific perspectives in assessing reliability. Particularly, her social and cooperative construal of science makes assessing the reliability of knowledge claims not the prerogative of a single epistemic community but the collective task of multiple epistemic communities, across a plurality of scientific perspectives (5). Hence, hers is a form of ‘perspectival realism.’