Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief

In James H. Collier, The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 139-148 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper, I explain a challenge to the Equal Weight View coming from the psychology of group inquiry, and evaluate its merits. I argue that while the evidence from the psychology of group inquiry does not give us a reason to reject the Equal Weight View, it does require making some clarifications regarding what the view does and does not entail, as well as a revisiting the ethics of belief.

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