Situational logic and covering law explanations in history

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):388 – 399 (1968)
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Abstract

Donagan has argued (a) that the covering law model of explanation does not apply in certain cases in historical explanations; (b) that situational logic explanations do apply, and (c) that situational logic explanations are fundamentally different from covering law explanations. It is argued that (b) is false as Donagan construes situational logic explanations. Once situational logic explanations are correctly construed they are similar to Hempel's rational explanations in covering law forms — hence (c) is false if situational logic explanations are correctly interpreted. Finally it is argued that one major reason Donagan gives for (a) is mistaken.

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References found in this work

Laws and explanation in history.William H. Dray - 1964 - Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

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