Relative Correctness

Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373 (2014)
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Abstract

John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge can be given against MacFarlane’s revised views on assertion. The main objection to the relativist is that rational and earnest speakers are not bound by assessment-relative standards of correctness.

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Teresa Marques
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Retractions.Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3335-3359.
Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Future contingents and relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.

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