Abstract

Sentimentalists claim that moral judgments essentially involve emotions. Some modern sentimentalists cite a growing body of neuropsychological evidence in support of this claim. Phillip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that these “neurosentimentalists” rely on evidence taken from studies of non-agents, and thus ignore a fundamental constraint facing any account of decision making or judgment. If, as Gerrans and Kennett claim, only agents can make judgments, then theories of moral judgment cannot rely on studies of non-agents for evidential support. If this argument is correct, then neurosentimentalists face a dilemma: accept that their key evidence is inadmissible, or grant that non-agents can make moral judgments. I consider the adequacy of Gerrans and Kennett's critique by examining the evidence that they contest, and show that they are mistaken in claiming that this evidence comes from studies of non-agents. I conclude that the “neurosentimentalists’ dilemma” is thus dissolved, and that neurosentimentalists are vindicated in their use of this evidence.