Intrinsic Explanation and Field’s Dispensabilist Strategy

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163-183 (2013)
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Abstract

Philosophy of mathematics for the last half-century has been dominated in one way or another by Quine’s indispensability argument. The argument alleges that our best scientific theory quantifies over, and thus commits us to, mathematical objects. In this paper, I present new considerations which undermine the most serious challenge to Quine’s argument, Hartry Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory

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Russell Marcus
Hamilton College

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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