Abstract

This work was initiated as a comparative study of the Background , and the habitus , understood as parallel attempts to explain behaviors which are socially apt, yet not consciously so. The elements of the reality of an agent signified by each concept are compared from different standpoints [process of acquisition, constitution, function]; moreover, the analogous theoretical functions of the concepts are examined. The difference that emerges as focal from this comparison, is the intentional or not character of the realities signified: the Background is conceived as non-intentional [as a neurophysiological mechanism]; conversely, the habitus is treated as intentional, although not consciously so [even though the issue is hardly ever directly posed by Bourdieu]. I place this difference in the context of each thinker's conception of intentionality: Searle conceives intentionality as a characteristic of conscious mental states; Bourdieu---as it may be reconstructed from his manner of elaborating on the habitus---presupposes a more diversified conception of intentionality, encompassing a strong corporeal dimension. I elaborate on the ramifications of this difference in defining intentionality for each thinker's general conception of the actuality/function of social reality [largely, for answering questions regarding the constitution and the undisturbed function of institutions, and the preservation of social order in general]. ;In an attempt to provide a more systematic analysis of the issue of non-representational intentionality [absent from Bourdieu's work] I turn to Merleau-Ponty's thought, where it is perceived as a pivotal phenomenological concern, and developed from a variety of perspectives. Reconstructing elements of Bourdieu's and Merleau-Ponty's thought, I carve my own account of non-representational intentionality: I discuss the forms in which it may be encountered, its function, and, moreover, how its acceptance dictates a revision of one's perceptual schema of social reality. ;Finally, I claim that the theme of non-represented significance as the taken for granted fabric of social reality, has been encountered in 20 th century philosophy, through concepts as form of life and life-world. I explore the content/implications of these concepts within their respective theoretical contexts, and elaborate on the elements that Bourdieu's standpoint borrows from the phenomenological [-Wittgensteinian] perspective, but also on how this general perspective may be reciprocally fertilized by Bourdieuian dimensions of analysis regarding the symbolic autonomy of the body in social interaction and, correlatively, the quasi-political relevance/effectiveness of nonrepresented significance